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WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO DO THE
RIGHT THING?
Ran Kuttner, Ph.D.*
“No Dharma was taught by the Buddha
At any time, in any place, to any person.”
(Naˆgaˆrjuna, second century AD)1
“Doing no evil,
Engaging in what’s skillful,
And purifying one’s mind:
This is the teaching of the Buddhas.”
(Shakyamuni, fourth century BC)2
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I. INTRODUCTION
Leonard Riskin emphasizes in his opening article that cultivating mindful-
ness can help negotiators enhance their ability to relate to the core concerns that
underlie one’s emotions.3  In an earlier article, Riskin emphasized that cultivat-
ing mindfulness can help promote compliance with the ethical precepts that
derive from the Golden Rule that we should treat others as we would have them
treat us, from which a significant portion of the rules of ethical conduct seem to
derive.4  Riskin goes beyond the concept of ethics as an adoption of rules of
conduct.  Instead, he suggests that the cultivation of mindfulness can help
develop inner skills (e.g., calmness, equanimity) and awareness of our intercon-
* Assistant Professor for Negotiation and Dispute Resolution at the Werner Institute for
Negotiation and Dispute Resolution, Creighton University School of Law.
1 N ˆAG ˆARJUNA, THE FUNDAMENTAL WISDOM OF THE MIDDLE WAY 76 (Jay L. Garfield trans.,
1995).  When introducing Buddhist terms, I will use the Sanskrit writing, unless otherwise
noted.  As it is not a study on Buddhism, I will ignore the macrons that are part of the
original Sanskrit spelling.
2 SIDDHARTA GAUTAMA, THE DHAMMAPADA 49 (Gil Fronsdal trans., Shambhala Press
2005).  Shakyamuni is also called Siddhaˆrtha Gautama and is related to as the Buddha.
3 Leonard L. Riskin, Annual Saltman Lecture:  Further Beyond Reason:  Emotions, the
Core Concerns, and Mindfulness in Negotiation, 10 NEV. L.J. 289 (2010).
4 Leonard L. Riskin, Awareness and Ethics in Dispute Resolution and Law:  Why Mindful-
ness Tends to Foster Ethical Behavior, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 493 passim (2009).
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nectedness.5  Such awareness, he explains, may lead to ethical behavior that
complies with the Golden Rule.6
In this Commentary, I wish to follow this perspective, and to add a com-
plimentary layer that may assist in clarifying why, and in what way, the cultiva-
tion of mindfulness and wisdom as understood within the Buddhist worldview
can promote ethical conduct.  As mindfulness is a Buddhist concept that is part
of a larger Buddhist system of thought, a better understanding of the Buddhist
worldview and the context in which the concept of mindfulness emerged may
help us go further in understanding how Buddhist philosophy and practice can
help foster ethical behavior.  It will allow us to create new synthesis between
the Buddhist worldview and the quest for ethical conduct in Western traditions,
including in the legal profession.  I will suggest that Buddhist mindfulness and
wisdom should not be considered helpful only in terms of compliance to ethical
rules, but from a more foundational perspective, of cultivating a mindset, a
being-in-the-world that sees clearly the nature of being and brings one to spon-
taneously act in an ethical manner as well as to manage emotions in negotiation
in a skillful manner.
It may sound in various parts of this Commentary as if I am suggesting
that we can dispense with ethical rules.  This is not the case, as I will explain in
the coming pages.  It is my concern that referring to the Buddhist concept of
mindfulness without the larger context of the Buddhist worldview limits the
possibility of understanding the Buddhist worldview’s added values to master-
ing the ethical conduct.
There exists a long-standing debate in the history of philosophy of
whether moral behavior is the outcome of adopting and following a certain set
of prescribed norms or, rather, the outcome of a mindset or disposition that
could be cultivated, and out of which ethical behavior emerges.  Likewise, this
debate applies to the internal discourse within the Buddhist tradition:  Does
moral conduct and following certain ethical rules lead to the cultivation of wis-
dom (prajna), as understood in the Buddhist tradition, or is the right action
derived from the cultivated wisdom, which is the source of ethical behavior?7
One insight that emerges from that debate is that, regardless of which is the
chicken and which is the egg, the cultivation of mindfulness and wisdom as
understood in the Buddhist tradition plays an important role in the cultivation
of behavior that we may also consider as ethical.  The aim of this Commentary
is to show that if we wish to explore to what extent mindfulness can help us
find improved ways to relate to each other in an ethical manner, we can gain
5 Id. at 498, 501-02.
6 Id. at 498.  In this Commentary, I will follow Riskin’s usage of the term rules to describe
what Dworkin may regard as principles.  Dworkin emphasizes that principles have more
weight and importance than rules and sees them as background standards against which acts
should be judged and decided upon, beyond the more functional rules of law.  He explains:
“‘A will is invalid unless signed by three witnesses’ is not very different in form from ‘A
man may not profit from his own wrong’, but one who knows something of American law
knows that he must take the first as stating a rule and the second as stating a principle.”
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 27 (1977).  It is important to note that the
Golden Rule and other ethical rules that will be mentioned later fall more under the category
of principles and that compliance to principles is different from compliance to legal rules.
7 See, e.g., BERNIE GLASSMAN, INFINITE CIRCLE:  TEACHINGS IN ZEN 7-8, 29-30 (2002).
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from showing the extent to which ethical conduct is derived from the cultiva-
tion of a mindset that is identified in the Buddhist philosophy as “wisdom.”  I
suggest that ethical conduct acquired through Buddhist practice should be
viewed as part of a larger scope of being-in-the-world, an existential (mental,
physical, and spiritual) condition in which perceived ethical behavior resonates.
By gradually cultivating the aforementioned mindset, a lawyer or conflict reso-
lution specialist will cultivate conduct that leans less on rules of conduct, and
more on a new awareness of her relations to others.
This discussion somewhat resembles the manner in which Lon Fuller saw
mediation as helping question the source of social order.  When laying out his
vision of mediation back in 1971, Fuller stated that one of the important fea-
tures of this newly born court-connected procedure was that it could
offset the tendency of modern thought to assume that all social order must be
imposed by some kind of “authority.”  When we perceive how a mediator, claiming
no “authority,” can help the parties give order and coherence to their relationship, we
may in the process come to realize that there are circumstances in which the parties
can dispense with this aid, and that social order can often arise directly out of the
interactions it seems to govern and direct.8
If this is the case, my mediative role in this Commentary is to explore how to
offset the tendency to assume that ethical action is a derivation of some kind of
authoritative rules of ethical behavior or of the Golden Rule presented above.
Instead, this Commentary explores whether there are circumstances in which,
through the realization of the Buddhist underpinnings, we can dispense with
this aid and claim no ethical authority, instead allowing order and coherence to
arise directly out of the interaction.  I will try to show how the internal logic of
the Buddhist worldview, as will be described in later sections, may take us in
that direction, as it is the interpersonal interaction itself from which, according
to the Buddhist worldview, our ethical behavior, as well as our emotions, draw
their unique internal logic. Both mindfulness and wisdom are necessary condi-
tions for realizing that logic.9  Fuller adds:
[T]he central quality of mediation [is] its capacity to reorient the parties toward each
other, not by imposing rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new and
shared perception of their relationship, a perception that will redirect their attitudes
and dispositions toward one another.
This quality of mediation becomes most visible when the proper function of the
mediator turns out to be, not that of inducing the parties to accept formal rules for the
governance of their future relations, but that of helping them to free themselves from
the encumbrance of rules and of accepting, instead, a relationship of mutual respect,
trust and understanding that will enable them to meet shared contingencies without
the aid of formal prescriptions . . . .10
In resemblance to the practice of mediation as described by Fuller, Buddhist
practice and the Buddhist teaching, when aimed at the interpersonal level, do
just that, i.e., help people achieve a new and shared perception of their relation-
8 Lon L. Fuller, Mediation—Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 315 (1971).
9 I use the term realize to note both the understanding of, and the making concrete presence
of, that unique logic, as the Buddhist worldview does not offer us an intellectual analysis that
needs to be mastered (being, in itself, a set of rules), but invites us, through practice, to
examine that logic through direct, existential experience.
10 Fuller, supra note 8, at 325-26.
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ship via the non-imposition of rules, and, according to some interpretations,
address ethics in a similar manner.11  I will argue that the added value of mind-
fulness practice to conflict resolution specialists and lawyers lies in the realiza-
tion of Buddhist wisdom.
I believe that this is consistent with Riskin’s statement, when describing
the “lawyer’s standard philosophical map” over a quarter of a century ago, that
the legal profession should revisit its reliance on the application of general rules
of law for resolving disputes.12  In particular, Riskin explains there that this
governing assumption should be challenged by a focus on the unique character-
istics of the situation, as each situation cannot be governed by any general
principle except to the extent that the parties accept it.13  I will suggest in this
Commentary that the very same challenge applies also to lawyers’ use of ethi-
cal rules, if a thorough reexamination of the ethical philosophical map is
sought.
This Article will explore how the practice of mindfulness and the cultiva-
tion of wisdom as understood in the Buddhist philosophy can help develop a
mindset that will assist lawyers and conflict resolution specialists to make con-
scious ethical decisions and to do the “right thing” in different situations.  It
will draw a distinction between the two central terms, “mindfulness” and “wis-
dom,” clarify the philosophical underpinnings of “wisdom,” introduce founda-
tional concepts in Buddhist philosophy, and suggest that in order to cultivate
the aforementioned mindset, it is important to go beyond “mindfulness” and
meet the challenges that the cultivation of “wisdom” pose.  Part II, Being-in-
the-World, will explain what it means to cultivate a mindset and acquire what
Buddhist thought relates to as “wisdom.”  Part III, titled Dharma, which stands
for the teachings of the Buddha, will present basic notions of Buddhist philoso-
phy to help understand what the unique transformation and cultivation of that
new mindset involves, and what the applications of the Buddha’s teachings to
conflict resolution contexts may be.  Part IV—Right Speech, which is one of
the aspects of the Eightfold Path that the Buddha presented to help cultivate
“wisdom”—will present a concrete example that can help lawyers and conflict
resolution specialists cultivate wisdom, and consequently act rightfully and
ethically.  Part V will discuss the implications of adapting the ideas from previ-
ous sections to the lawyer’s and conflict resolution specialist’s “right conduct”
in practice.  Part VI will offer a perspective on what it takes to become skillful
in the manner suggested in this article, using the Buddhist notion of “Skillful
Means.”  Part VII will offer some concluding remarks.
II. BEING-IN-THE-WORLD
It is important to note that the ideas laid out in the succeeding pages do not
hint towards a nihilistic view or call for subjective evaluation of ethical behav-
ior.  Indeed, both the nihilistic and the subjectivist conclusions would miss the
lesson taught within the Buddhist framework.  The conclusion that annihilates
11 See BHANTE HENEPOLA GUNARATANA, MINDFULNESS IN PLAIN ENGLISH 23-24 (Wisdom
Publ’ns 2002) (1991).
12 See Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 43, 45 (1982).
13 Id. at 45.
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ethical standards or any kind of relevant teaching would be erroneous, just as a
literal reading of Nagarjuna’s quote at the outset to this Commentary14 would
miss the wisdom of the Buddhist framework.  Such conclusion will also fail to
do justice to the Buddha’s teaching quoted above,15 or to the five basic precepts
that the Buddhist practitioner is encouraged to observe:  to abstain from killing,
from taking things not freely given, from sexual misconduct, from false speech,
and from intoxicating drinks and drugs causing heedlessness.16  In addition, the
idea that it is up to each person to decide what ethical standards to follow, if
any, or that there is no right thing to do—as a lawyer, in negotiations, or in any
other human situation—is somewhat contradictory to the realization of the
Buddhist core principles.  However, the word right will be newly defined in the
pages to come.
It is also important to note at this point that the different concepts of
“mindfulness” and “wisdom,” as used above, are both central to the Buddhist
framework.  There are three major integral factors in Buddhist practice:  moral-
ity (sila), concentration (samadhi), and wisdom (prajna), each one influencing
the other.  Mindfulness is usually considered to be a practice of cultivating
concentration, a necessary condition that makes it possible to cultivate wisdom
and compassion, the proximate cause to the obtainment of wisdom.  “The
method is mindfulness, the expression is compassion and the essence is wis-
dom,” explains Joseph Goldstein, a leading meditation teacher and author of
various influential books on Buddhism. He adds that, “Wisdom sees the imper-
manent, ephemeral nature of experience and the basic unreliability of these
changing phenomena.  Wisdom opens our minds to the experience of selfless-
ness, the great liberating jewel of the Buddha’s enlightenment.  This under-
standing, in turn, engenders a compassionate engagement with the world.”17
Therefore, while mindfulness practice can lead us to better compliance with the
ethical rules and to improved management of the core concerns throughout a
negotiation or other conflict resolution processes, cultivation of wisdom may
help us move beyond mindfulness to a realization of the nature of experience,
of which compassion and ethical behavior is a derivation:  “When you have the
wisdom to truly understand a situation, compassion toward all parties involved
is automatic . . . thus, your behavior is automatically moral.”18
14 See N ˆAG ˆARJUNA, supra note 1, at 76.
15 See GAUTAMA, supra note 2, at 170.
16 See WALPOLA RAHULA, WHAT THE BUDDHA TAUGHT 47 (2d ed. Grove Press 1974)
(1959).
17 Joseph Goldstein, Three Means to Peace, SHAMBHALA SUN, Mar. 2004, at 30, available
at http://www.shambhalasun.com/index2.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=
1489&Itemid=0.  Andrew Olendzki explains:
Mindfulness leads to insight and insight leads to wisdom.  The kind of insight referred to in
this context is not the conceptual insight into one’s personal narrative, but a more visceral and
intuitive glimpse of the conditioned, constructed, changeable and impersonal nature of our
mental and physical life.
. . . Eventually, recurring episodes of insight will contribute to more lasting alterations of
the mind, a process the Buddhists refer to as the deepening of wisdom.  This sort of insight
changes us profoundly.
Andrew Olendzki, The Roots of Mindfulness, in MINDFULNESS AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 241,
259 (Christopher K. Germer, Ronald D. Siegel & Paul R. Fulton eds., 2005).
18 GUNARATANA, supra note 11, at 23.  He adds:
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Cultivating wisdom is the embodiment of a mindset, a philosophy, a way
of being-in-the-world, which goes beyond the adoption of certain rules of con-
duct.19  An important aspect of the “institutionalization process” that conflict
resolution, as a discipline, is undergoing, is the shift from “best practices” and
concern with techniques, to focusing on the need to see the conflict resolution
specialist’s proficiency in more holistic terms, as part of a wider state of being,
and exploring the philosophical foundations accordingly.20  In recent decades,
many legal writers have aspired for this same shift with regard to the legal
profession.  Among these authors is Riskin, who challenges the field through
his view of the lawyer’s standard philosophical map, and moreover in his work
on mindfulness and the law.  “The traditional mind-set,” he writes while relat-
ing to mindfulness practice’s added value, “provides a constricted vision of
legal problems and human relations that rests on separation and autonomy, on
rights and rules.  Thus, it contrasts with mind-sets grounded on connection,
relationship, and duty.  And mind-sets can affect a lawyer’s understanding and
performance in virtually any task.”21
This Commentary presents similar ideas:  I suggest seeing the cultivation
of mindfulness and the aspiration to cultivate wisdom as part of a more holistic
Buddhist system of thought and of its existential view of being-in-the-world.
The Buddhist cultivation of wisdom and the realization of its underpinnings
shed light on, among other things, ethical actions and their partaking in a larger
gestalt of being-in-the-world, applicable to conflict resolution specialists, as
well as to lawyers.
III. DHARMA
Buddhist wisdom, as mentioned above, involves a deep realization of the
foundations of the Buddha’s teachings, the Dharma.  These include the realiza-
tion of emptiness, of impermanence, and of dependent co-arising, that is, the
[T]here are levels of morality.  The lowest level is adherence to a set of rules and regulations laid
down by somebody else. . . .
The next level of morality consists of obeying the same rules even in the absence of some-
body who will smack you.  You obey because you have internalized the rules.  You smack
yourself every time you break one.  This level requires a bit of mind control. . . .
There is a third level of morality, which might be better termed “ethics.”  This level is a
quantum leap up the scale from the first two levels, a complete shift in orientation.  At the level
of ethics, a person does not follow hard and fast rules dictated by authority.
Id. at 23-24.
19 Avalokitesvara, the Bodhisattva of Compassion (i.e., the figure that symbolizes the high-
est level of compassion in the Buddhist tradition), for example, is not a being that acts
compassionately, but rather is the embodiment of compassion, a being whose entire exis-
tence is compassionate—in mind, in body and in spirit.
20
“It is about being a mediator, rather than simply doing certain prescribed steps dictated
by a particular mediation school or theory.” BRINGING PEACE INTO THE ROOM:  HOW THE
PERSONAL QUALITIES OF THE MEDIATOR IMPACT THE PROCESS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 16
(Daniel Bowling & David Hoffman eds., 2003).  This treatise goes on to apply a famous
quote by Ghandi to the context of mediation by stating, “Be the change you wish to create in
the world.” Id. at 272.
21 Leonard L. Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer:  On the Potential Contributions of Mind-
fulness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers, and their Clients, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1,
16 (2002).
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realization that it is illusive to ascribe characteristics of inner-self, having a
firm, fixed, and independent core or essence, to any presumably independent
and delimited object.  All entities, according to the Buddhist worldview, are
empty of such inner core or essence, and can only completely be realized
through the relational manner in which they, and their characteristics,
dependently co-arise within a given context.
Contrary to that, according to common Western, Aristotelian principles,
knowing an object’s essence means exposing its self-identity, its unchanging
inherent, essential characteristics, which are not affected by, and are thus inde-
pendent of, outside variables or the inner-characteristics of other objects.22
This essentialist worldview:
sees on both the ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ sides of the s → o type of situation self-
subsistent substances, the boundaries of  each of which are inalterably fixed and
determined by its ‘essence.’  Here o, say, an apple, is a self-subsistent substance with
a more or less strictly delimited ontological sphere, the delimitation being supplied
by its own ‘essence,’ i.e. apple-ness.  In the same manner, the ego which, as the
subject, perceives the apple is an equally self-subsistent substance furnished with an
‘essence’ which, in this case, happens to be its I-ness.23
As mentioned above, the Buddhist worldview offers different philosophi-
cal foundations, based on a relational system of thought that is couched in the
notion of dependent co-arising (pratityasamutpapda):
The position of pratityasamutpada stands definitely against this view.  Such a view,
Buddhism asserts, does nothing other than reflect the phenomenal surface of reality.
According to the Buddhist view, it is not the case that there does exist in the external
world a substance with a certain number of qualities, called ‘apple.’  The truth is
rather that Something phenomenally appears to the subject as an ‘apple.’  The phe-
nomenal appearance of the ‘apple’ as an ‘apple’ depends upon a certain positive
attitude on the part of the subject.  Conversely, however, the very fact that ‘apple’
phenomenally appears as such to his eyes, establishes man as the perceiving ego, the
subject of cognition.24
The idea of a “thing,” an entity or object with internal unchanging characteris-
tics or conditions, is an illusion, according to the Buddhist worldview.  First,
there are no unconditional entities:  All “things” are causally dependent, or
rather, dependently co-arise.  Second, everything is in a never-ending, ceaseless
motion, and nothing is permanent.25
In order to understand the Buddhist departure from nihilistic conclusions,
it is important to better understand the notion of emptiness (sunyata), and the
22 Descartes, in his book, Meditations on First Philosophy, which is considered to be one of
the foundational essays of modernity and of the enlightenment era, follows the Aristotelian
system of thought and lays out one of the rules that governs modern thinking, claiming that
knowledge is obtained when an entity is perceived in its distinctness:  “[E]verything that we
clearly and distinctly understand is true in a way which corresponds exactly to our under-
standing of it . . . .” RENE DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 9 (John Cotting-
ham ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1641).
23 TOSHIHIKO IZUTSU, TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF ZEN BUDDHISM 23 (Prajna Press 1977).
24 Id. at 23-24.
25 In Western philosophy Heraclites, the fifth century BC Greek philosopher is known for
holding a similar view.  He claimed that everything is changing and flowing (“panta rei”).
However, his view was not accepted, and the essentialist Pythagorean-Aristotelian view
prevailed.
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way in which it helps avoid the conclusion that the self is non-existent.  The
allegation that “nothing exists as an independent substantial entity” may lead to
the conclusion that things are empty of inner nature or essence.  Therefore, the
Buddhist worldview concludes that things do exist, but with no firm form as
finite, separate entities; “things” are empty, and this emptiness leads to the
inability to define them or to grasp them as having a determinate form.
“Things” are empty of the characteristics of finitude, substantivity, and
separateness.
However, such conclusion is only a partial conclusion, for it still contains
the presupposition that things exist, as “things,” even if empty of inner essence.
It is important to realize (existentially, not as an intellectual exercise) that
“they” are also empty of the conclusion invited by their emptiness, the conclu-
sion that “they” exist, even if “they” are empty of self, because “things” have a
form.  “Things” are ungraspable, not as existent nor as non-existent, but in a
different, “middle” way:  as dependently co-arising.26  Therefore, the real
nature of “things” is neither existent nor non-existent.  Their “real nature” is an
empty notion, empty in the strong sense of the word, empty in the sense that
not only do they lack “real nature,” but they also lack a self-existence that is
capable of lacking “real nature.”  T.P. Kasulis explains:  “Emptiness—the logi-
cal inter-dependence of opposing terms—lies at the basis of all philosophical
distinctions.”27
When distinguishing between “party A” and “party B” in a negotiation,
and when a lawyer focuses on a client’s concerns, it is therefore important to
realize the manner in which the parties’ separate existence dependently co-
arises in the particular context in which the distinction is made.  Furthermore, it
is important to realize that clinging to, or zealously advocating for, a fixed and
firm image of the “thing” (e.g., the client, a certain position, a line of argumen-
tation, etc.), which one then craves to preserve and on which one fixates, does
not do justice to the unfolding complex situation.  The Dalai Lama explained to
an audience of conflict resolution trainees that, from the perspective of
Dharma:
We say that the root causes [of suffering] are hatred and attachment, and separa-
tion of ‘we’ and ‘others.’  Building this strong notion of “self” and “others” is based
on ignorance, or not knowing reality.  All these problems are caused by ignorance of
the concrete grasping of the self, which is diametrically opposed to the comprehen-
26
“The middle way” or “path” is one of the central Buddhist principles. See RAHULA,
supra note 16, at 45.
27 T.P. KASULIS, ZEN ACTION ZEN PERSON 24 (1981).  For an elaboration on Naˆgaˆrjuna’s
view of emptiness and dependent co-arising and the non-existence of “things;” see also
HSUEH-LI CHENG, EMPTY LOGIC:  M ˆADHYAMIKE BUDDHISM FROM CHINESE SOURCES (1991);
Ewing Chinn, Naˆgaˆrjuna’s Fundamental Doctrine of Pratıˆtyasamutpaˆda, 51 PHILOSOPHY E.
& W. 54 (2001); Jay L. Garfield & Graham Priest, Naˆgaˆrjuna and the Limits of Thought, 53
PHILOSOPHY E. & W. 1, 1-2 (2003); Jay L. Garfield, Dependent Arising and the Emptiness of
Emptiness:  Why Did Naˆgaˆrjuna Start with Causation?, 44 PHILOSOPHY E. & W. 219
(1994).
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sion of selflessness.  This is a very profound discussion of the Buddhist
philosophy.28
In their book Beyond Winning, Robert Mnookin, Scott Peppet, and
Andrew Tulumello describe the common occurrences that we experience when
we face a conflict:
When faced with conflict, we tend to either advocate forcefully—often too force-
fully—our own view or focus on the other side’s view . . . . We each assert our own
story and listen to the other side only for the purpose of constructing a “Yes, but”
response.  We cycle through argument and counter-argument, never demonstrating
understanding or really communicating very effectively.
. . . Either I can listen and try to understand your point of view, or I can assert
my own. . . . Once I understand your view—and show you I understand—holding on
to my own perspective will become too difficult.  After all, if I agreed with your view
I wouldn’t have mine! . . . Our views are just fundamentally different.  If I advocate
for mine, I can’t also advocate for yours.  It’s one or the other, not both.29
When the parties or their representatives arrive at the negotiation table with a
distributive mindset and argumentative mode, their inclination is to present
firm and secured positions, clear and distinctive, clarified in separation, to
which they cling firmly and which they advocate zealously.  The realization of
dependent co-arising is necessary for uprooting these tendencies and for acting
in a manner that is in line with mindfulness and wisdom, and which is also—
among other things—ethical.30
It is this realization of “self” and “other” that allows overcoming suffering
that humans impose on themselves as well as on other humans.  “Suffering”
(duhkha), also translated as “discomfort,” is a central term in the Buddhist
framework; it is what the Buddhist practice is aimed at transforming. Duhkha
is caused by an illusory mindset, by not-seeing the true nature of reality, i.e.,
from being ignorant (avidya).  Avidya literally means non-sight, which means
lacking the ability to see the true nature of things, and which is the opposite of
being with wisdom, that is, with the realization of the Buddhist tenets.  Suffer-
ing, therefore, is caused by the non-realization of the emptiness of “self” and of
the dependent co-arising nature of “self” and “other.”
IV. RIGHT SPEECH
Let us now move to a concrete example in order to better understand the
difference between a behavior that follows ethical rules and a behavior that is
28 The XIV Dalai Lama, All These Problems are Caused by Ignorance, in ELSE HAMMER-
ICH, MEETING CONFLICT MINDFULLY 1, 2 (2001) available at http://www.konfliktloesning.
dk/files/Bog_Meeting_Conflicts_Mindfully_2001_0.pdf.
29 ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, BEYOND WINNING:
NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 50-51 (2000).
30 [B]roader orientations toward lawyering . . . respond to problems associated with the domi-
nance of the Lawyer’s Standard Philosophical Map. . . . Mindfulness can help lawyers expand
their focus to include . . . broader perspectives and to carry out the aspirations associated with
them.  It can do this by helping them learn to observe their mind-sets, habitual reactions, and
beliefs without being attached to them.  Such awareness can allow them to entertain other per-
spectives.  Mindfulness practices also can produce compassion, generosity, and new understand-
ings of self and others.
Riskin, supra note 21, at 48-49.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\10-2\NVJ204.txt unknown Seq: 10  7-JUL-10 11:34
416 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:407
the realization of the principles described above.  More specifically, it is the
manner in which we speak to each other that we will examine from both
perspectives.
The Buddha’s Fourth Noble Truth, in which he lays out the path that leads
to the transformation of suffering, is a composition of eight awarenesses, that
is, eight aspects or flavors of enlightenment, which should be practiced.31  One
of the eight components of the Buddha’s Fourth Noble Truth is “right speech”
(samma vaca).32  The fourth Buddhist precept, as mentioned above, is the
abstinence from “false speech.”  One may ask how we should understand the
notion of “right speech.”  What does it mean abstinence from “false speech?”
It is common to describe “right speech” as a normative moral order, to tell
people what kind of speech they should and should not use while addressing
their fellow beings.  For example, when describing “Key Points For Mindful-
ness of Skillful Speech,” and while choosing to translate the term commonly
translated into “right” as “skillful,” Gunaratana writes:
Here are the key points for preventing unhappiness by way of Skillful Speech:
• Skillful speech requires that you abstain from lying, malicious words, harsh
language, and useless talk.
• Lying by omission is still lying.
• Malicious talk is speech that destroys other people’s friendships or damages
their reputations.
• Verbal abuse, profanity, sarcasm, hypocrisy, and excessively blunt or belit-
tling criticism are all examples of harsh language.
• Harsh language hurts others and debases you.
• Gossip and idle talk lead to quarrels and misunderstandings, waste your time,
and create a confused state of mind.
• All unnecessary speech not motivated by generosity, loving-friendliness, and
compassion is harmful.
• The test of Skilful Speech is to stop and ask yourself before you speak:  “Is it
true?  Is it kind?  Is it beneficial?  Does it harm anyone?  Is this the right time
to say something?”
• Using mindfulness to strengthen your resolution to say nothing hurtful and to
use only soft, well-chosen words can bring harmony to any difficult
situation.33
In this example, the teaching of “right speech” supplies some rules that one
should follow; practicing mindfulness should draw one’s attention to those
rules.
However, different interpretations of the term “right speech” would tie its
explication to the ontological underpinnings, the ways of being in the world,
described earlier, and would call for a different kind of awareness.  Maezumi
31 See RAHULA, supra note 16, at 45.
32 The other components are Right Understanding (Samma ditthi), Right Thought (Samma
sankappa), Right Action (Samma kammanta), Right Livelihood (Samma ajiva), Right Effort
(Samma vayama), Right Mindfulness (Samma sati), and Right Concentration (Samm
Samadhi).  It is important to note that each of the eight components encompasses the other
seven, and cannot be realized without the qualities of the other seven, for example, attaining
Right Speech demands the attainment of right livelihood, or understanding.  In fact, these
components are eight different manifestations of the very same realization. Id. at 45-46.
33 BHANTE HENEPOLA GUNARATANA, EIGHT MINDFUL STEPS TO HAPPINESS:  WALKING THE
BUDDHA’S PATH 107-08 (2001).
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and Glassman, when addressing the different manners by which the eight
awarenesses (which for our purpose are the Eightfold Path, the Fourth Noble
Truth) are interpreted, write:  “On one level, then, the eight awarenesses are a
description of how our practice actually proceeds.  But more fundamentally,
how should we relate to the eight awarenesses?  Are they moral or ethical
guidelines, or are they actually aspects of the enlightened nature or a descrip-
tion of the Buddha himself?”34
Before moving to an interpretation that emphasizes the latter, it is impor-
tant to clarify the term “right,” which is a translation of the Pali term samma
(Sanskrit: sayag).  The translation of samma into right, does not capture the
full meaning of the term.  The word samma has the prefix “sam,” which means
“to be with,” accurately tuned, in a wholesome way.  The centrality of the
notion of dependent co-arising in the Buddha’s teaching is manifested through
the centrality of the notion of samma, which describes the actualization of wis-
dom in everyday aspects of life, speech included, if done in a wholesome man-
ner, i.e., accurately tuned with whatever arises with it.
Bringing the quality of right to every category of daily life calls for
moment-to-moment realization of dependent co-arising, in every deed.  The
Zen Master Bernie Glassman explains:
The word right, which precedes all these aspects, is not used in the usual dualistic
sense of right as opposed to wrong.  In this context right means “non-,” as in noncon-
cept or nonview. . . .
What do “right words or right speech” mean? . . . [S]peaking spontaneously
without the filters constructed by the mind, speaking with the whole being, just
speaking—that’s right speech.
Similarly, right effort means noneffort.  If I separate myself from what I am
doing, or if I see myself as doing anything at all, it’s not right effort.  Totally doing
what has to be done without separation from the deed is noneffort—nothing is being
done!35
Nothing is being done and nothing is being said in the sense that a separately
perceived self is saying something to a separate person (s → o) in a manner that
is not consistent with their co-dependent situation.  The quality of “right
speech” allows participants in a negotiation to realize the elusive and deluded
state of grasping at the independent and firm concepts or notions that encom-
pass separate, unchanging meaning.  This view is different from the perception
of a self who brings into the conversation firm positions, well-established argu-
mentations, pre-conceived notions and pre-suppositions, or input from past
memories.  It also differs from the pre-negotiation preparation that one clings to
in the dynamics of the negotiation, and tries to impose on the separately and
firmly perceived “other.”  The Dalai Lama explains:
[E]ven from the perspective of the transient nature of phenomena there is often a big
disparity between the way in which we perceive things and the way things really are.
For instance, when we meet someone we say, ‘Oh, this is the very same person I’ve
known for a long time.’  Again, when you see an object, you think, ‘Oh, this is the
same object which I saw two days ago.’  This is a very crude way of talking about
34 HAKUYU TAIZAN MAEZUMI & BERNARD TETSUGEN GLASSMAN, THE HAZY MOON OF
ENLIGHTENMENT 79 (1977).
35 GLASSMAN, supra note 7, at 49-50.
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reality.  What is actually happening here is a kind of a conflation between an image
or a concept of entity and the actual reality of the moment. . . .36
If we follow the Dalai Lama’s explanation, we would want to come to negotia-
tions with a mindset that allows us not to cling to pre-conceived images of the
“other” party as well as one’s own goals and positions.  That may assist in
conducting negotiations that are inherently more constructive.  The challenge
of the lawyer, however, is his fundamental obligation to “abide by a client’s
decision concerning the objectives of representation.”37  The lawyer reading
this Article, who may be cultivating mindfulness and wisdom, or intending to
do so, may rightfully ask:  What if my client’s positions are such that they will
not enable me to come to the negotiation table with such a mindset?  What if he
has strict positions and goals that are entirely  inflexible?  The challenge, I
believe, would be in the pre-negotiation meetings between the lawyer and the
client.  The lawyer who cultivates mindfulness and wisdom, would educate his
client, by deeds and speech, that changing the mindset may be beneficial for
him.  That does not happen overnight.  In many cases, the practical advantages
of such mindset may need to be stressed more than any other aspect.
The image or entity that one grasps is the attachment in need of transfor-
mation.  “Right speech” is possible when one lets go of that attachment.  “Right
speech” emerges or arises through and within the interaction, as opposed to a
firm and separately formed “right thing to say,” formed in advance. In this
context, the speech and speakers co-arise dependently with whatever is spoken.
Elaborating on the notion of “right speech,” Dwight Goddard writes:
The processes of the mind are an ever-flowing stream that, from the angle at
which we are now considering it, is comparatively inert until the mind attempts to
stop it and isolate particular ideas, feelings, and appearances.  Then follows discrimi-
nation, desires, grasping and action.  It is in this discrimination of the sense-concepts
of ideas and of egoism that trouble begins and is seated.38
The quality of “right speech” is particularly important, as speech is often used
to isolate, discriminate, and form permanent and independent non-contextual
meanings.39  Thus, speech used unwisely contributes to the formation of dis-
36 HIS HOLINESS THE XIV DALAI LAMA, THE POWER OF COMPASSION 95-96 (Geshe Thupten
Jinpa trans., 1995).
37 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2009).
38 DWIGHT GODDARD, THE BUDDHA’S GOLDEN PATH:  A MANUAL OF PRACTICAL BUD-
DHISM BASED ON THE TEACHINGS AND PRACTICES OF THE ZEN SECT, BUT INTERPRETED AND
ADAPTED TO MEET MODERN CONDITIONS 33 (London, Luzac & Co. 1930).
39 Nietzsche, for example, draws a comparison between music and words.  Music in its
unrestricted form has the Dionysian power to access to the innermost core of things, having
no need for the image and the concept; although “the word, the image, the concept seeks an
expression analogous to music,” FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY 40 (Doug-
las Smith trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (1872), it belongs to the realm of the Apollonian
power and acts only as dead symbols that cannot convey the vividness of Dionysus and
access that “innermost core of things” of which Nietzsche is craving.  Dionysus and Apollo,
two gods from the Greek mythology, present in Nietzsche’s early work two complementary
powers and tendencies in the human psyche and the world.  Writes Nietzsche:
Apollo stands before me as the transfiguring genius of the principium individuationis, through
which alone true redemption in appearance can be attained, while under the mystical cry of
exultation of Dionysus the spell of individuation is burst apart and the path to the Mothers of
Being, to the innermost core of things, lies open.
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crimination and categorization.  One will then cling to discrimination and cate-
gorization, which are the sources of suffering and unwholesome or unskillful
actions according to the Buddhist worldview.  Speech used unskillfully or
unwisely—either directed towards others or as inner speech—disrupts that flow
and creates the mindset and behavior described above.  Peter Harvey stated:
Overall, one can say that an ‘unwholesome’ action . . . contributes to more unwhole-
some states arising and liberating wisdom being weakened.  ‘Wholesome’ actions
have the opposite characteristics.  They arise from a virtuous motive, are free of all
direct harm to self and other, contribute to the improvement of the character of the
person who performs them, and thus assist in moving a person along the Path . . . .40
The unwholesome action disrupts both oneself and the other from realiz-
ing emptiness, impermanence, and dependent co-arising, and has the potential
to also be unethical.  It may lead to clinging to the firm, fixed positions of a
party and to further entrenchment in one’s narrow perspective, followed by
willingness to do all that one can do to get the most for him or herself.  When
the desire to get the most for oneself becomes the main goal, truthfulness and
the abstinence from deception and harming others may become secondary in
priority.41  With the awareness of the process of dependent co-arising, a lawyer
may gradually transform not only the standard adversarial win-lose philosophi-
cal map, but also the emphasis of the standard lawyer’s ethical map on zealous
advocacy,42 which implies a focus on one’s client’s positions at the expense of
a more integral vision of the situation at hand and the process in which the
parties co-arise.
Id. at 86.
Max Weber, following Nietzsche’s criticism of Socrates and his use of language to find
absolute truth, defined and claimed to be definite through conceptualization, addresses Greek
philosophy by claiming:
[F]or the first time the concept, one of the great tools of all scientific knowledge, has been
consciously discovered. . . . In Greece, for the first time, appeared a handy means by which one
could put the logical screws upon somebody so that he could not come out without admitting
either that he knew nothing or that this and nothing else was truth, the eternal truth that never
would vanish as the doings of the blind men vanish. . . . And from this it seemed to follow that if
one only found the right concept of the beautiful, the good, or, for instance, of bravery, of the
soul—or whatever—that then one could also grasp its true being.
MAX WEBER, Science as Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER:  ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 129, 141
(H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1946).
40 PETER HARVEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO BUDDHIST ETHICS:  FOUNDATIONS, VALUES AND
ISSUES 48 (2000).
41 Van M. Pounds explains:
[W]hat can be done to reconcile the lawyer’s responsibility to provide “zealous” representation
of her client’s interests with the competing, if not conflicting, desire that she participate in nego-
tiation in a candid manner?  Some commentators believe the answer lies in a modification and
modernization of the rules of professional conduct for the lawyer-negotiator. . . .
. . . [However] the solution to finding a more truthful course in negotiation may lie in the
practice of mindfulness.
Van M. Pounds, Promoting Truthfulness in Negotiation:  A Mindful Approach, 40 WILLAM-
ETTE L. REV. 181, 182-83 (2004).
42 According to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, “As advocate, a lawyer zealously
asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.” MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT preamble ¶ 2 (2009).
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For example, if a client describes a dispute and seeks advice, instead of
referring solely to legal claims and the likely court outcome, or swiftly building
one’s case or side of the story in a cohesive and firm manner that stands in
opposition to the other disputant’s case, an alternative course of action may be
to explore with the client the manner by which his perspective, understanding,
and assumptions on that case have been formed gradually in dependency with
the interaction of the actions and assertions of the other disputant.  Such explo-
ration may enable another level of awareness to arise in the interaction between
the lawyer and the client and provide new meaning to both the lawyer–client
co-arising process, as well as the client–other-party co-arising process.  When
hearing a new client, a mindful lawyer may be able to notice when she is draw-
ing too quickly from her past experience in “similar cases,” offering advice that
may mask certain needs and nuances of her client.  Such conduct may also
prevent her from delving in further with the client to see together the co-arising
elements in his story—both in the present-moment interaction with the lawyer
and in the context of the effect that the other party’s actions had.  In a co-
arising interaction between a lawyer and a client, they may jointly construct an
understanding of the occurrences and creative ideas regarding the pursuit of the
matter.  This will also allow the lawyer and client to explore, among other
things, the possibility of joint-action with the other party and his lawyer to
solve the case collaboratively.
By cultivating wisdom and “right speech,” one can learn to let go of the
illusive firm and fixed “self,” which clings to pre-conceived notions and craves
to preserve their firm existence, while holding also to a firm and fixed view of
the “other.”  By cultivating “right speech,” one lets go of that clinging, realizes
dependent co-arising, and the underpinnings that lead to adopting polarizing
either/or, right/wrong, and you/me patterns are transformed.43
Other concepts were used in the Buddhist tradition to describe “right
speech.” Describing the sixth century central Buddhist philosopher Dogen’s
notion of intimate words, which are words spoken in wisdom, Hee-Jin Kim
writes:  “Intimate words were those spoken and acted out by us in such a way
that there was no hiatus between words and referents, thought and reality, mind
and body . . . .”44  Intimate words are free from discursiveness, and are empty
43 Gregory Kramer writes:
[W]e seek to know things as they actually are.  When mindfulness is touched by any level of
activity, the experience is known as it is, clean and simple.  In that moment we stop building the
world.  There is no past or future, no mine or yours, no breaking or fixing.  Knowing exists side
by side with the mind’s fabrications.  We know these constructions as changing and insubstan-
tial, and we recognize the constructing nature of the mind.
GREGORY KRAMER, INSIGHT DIALOGUE:  THE INTERPERSONAL PATH TO FREEDOM 118
(2007).  Surrendering into the flux, lying is no longer an option.  Wetlaufer defines lying “to
include all means by which one might attempt to create in some audience a belief at variance
with one’s own.”  Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IOWA L.
REV. 1219, 1223 (1990).  The mindset that undergirds lying thus defined creates a separation
between one’s own beliefs and the beliefs one wishes to transplant in others.  Wetlaufer
explains that his definition of lying “does not rely upon the distinction between what is ‘true’
and what is ‘false,’” but “is drawn instead in terms of ‘beliefs at variance with one’s own.’”
Id. at 1224.
44 HEE-JIN KIM, EIHEI D ˆOGEN:  MYSTICAL REALIST 86 (2004).
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of separate, permanent, and independent meaning.  Gay Watson explains that
“[e]mptiness is used to see through the conceptual diffusion and differentiation
(prapanca) of language,”45 thus allowing participants in a conversation/negoti-
ation to realize the meaning of utterances, not from an understanding imposed
on the speech from previous knowledge, but through the mutual meaning that
co-arises at the particular present moment, as it is co-arising spontaneously
within the flow of the conversation.  The realization of the parties in the depen-
dent co-arising process as “a dynamic field of power in its entirety and whole-
ness . . . which is neither exclusively subjective nor exclusively objective, but
comprehending both the subject and the object in a peculiar state prior to its
being bifurcated into these two terms,”46 allows the parties to view the cli-
ent–lawyer as well as the client–client interaction in a new way, in accordance
with the Buddhist understanding of wisdom and while interacting with “right
speech.”
If mindful of the moment-to-moment co-arising nature of the thoughts and
ideas in conversation, speech will be realized as emerging, always in relation to
the occurrences in the conversation.  Then one will be fully aware of the
“other” person, not from one’s own egocentric perspective, but from a realiza-
tion of the process of dependent co-arising.  Mindful of the process of “right
speech,” one may be aware of moments in which gaps and divides are created,
and private languages—separate systems of making meaning—are used.  One
is then aware of the importance of clarifying the speech–acts that are misunder-
stood and of explaining how certain assertions emerge from the conversation.
One then makes the effort to create a shared understanding, thus avoiding dis-
crimination or categorization, in order to maintain “right speech.”
As the Buddha utters in his very last teaching before his death:
Having realization and being free from discrimination is what is called “avoiding idle
talk.”  To totally know the true form of all things is the same as being without idle
talk.47
“Idle talk,” therefore, is the opposite of “right speech,” describing utterances, or
speech acts, which instead of being dependently co-arising, are uttered by a
subject who imposes himself on the inter-action.  Thus, “idle talk” is speech
that discriminates, excludes, and filters whatever is inconsistent with one’s own
perspective and in accordance with one’s fixed, firm pre-contextual notions that
are being verified.  Such talk is idle because no effort is made to create mean-
ing together with the alleged other.  Instead, effort is made to impose a pre-
conceived notion on the other.  Such interpretation of “idle talk” or unwhole-
some/unskillful speech is different from the explanation provided by
Gunaratana as described above.48  While Gunaratana’s explanation refers to
content that is unwholesome, in this context, talk that is unwholesome or
unskillful refers to the non-realization of the Buddhist principle of dependent
co-arising, i.e., not being in a mindful state and the realization that comes with
wisdom.
45 GAY WATSON, THE RESONANCE OF EMPTINESS:  A BUDDHIST INSPIRATION FOR A CON-
TEMPORARY PSYCHOTHERAPY 204 (1998).
46 See IZUTSU, supra note 23, at 24-25.
47 MAEZUMI & GLASSMAN, supra note 34, at 151.
48 See GUNARATANA, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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Suffering thus understood is not created by the content of the words that
harm, but by the lack of “right speech,” alongside right effort, right understand-
ing/view, right concentration and right mindfulness, which are some of the
other components of the Eightfold Path that compound the Buddha’s Fourth
Noble Truth.  As connoted above, all of the components of the Eightfold Path
are needed in order to maintain a mindset from which non-divisive, skillful
speech and deeds emerge.
Causing harm and behaving unethically result from that lack of attainment
of the Eightfold Path.  Addressing the notion of “idle talk” and what is required
to transform it, Maezumi and Glassman write:
Being aware of what we say, we can avoid unnecessary talk, or talk that creates a
sense of a gap or separation from others.  In a positive way, we can talk in a way
which is not idle.  This again relates to eliminating the fundamental dichotomy of
subject and object.49
Doing the right thing or saying the right words, therefore, involves the realiza-
tion of the existential overcoming of the ontological subject/object divide.
With that overcoming, the Golden Rule, according to which “one” should not
do to the “other” what one does not want “others” to do to “oneself,” is revis-
ited.  With the cultivation of the being-in-the-world that the Buddhist wisdom
presents, one naturally refrains from unethical deeds, realizing that they:
1) come from ignorance and divisiveness; 2) perpetuate that unwholesome
mindset and unskillful dichotomization; and 3) are harmful to “oneself” as well
as to “the other.”50  Moreover, on the positive side, one knows what the “right
speech” and right action may be.51  When wisdom is absent, unwholesome and
divisive, speech is taking the place of right-speech.  But, with right understand-
ing/view and right mindfulness, speech is wholesome and arises from whatever
is taking place in the flow of dependent co-arising occurrences.  The un-medi-
ated, non-dualistic flow of co-arising is different from a situation composed by
a speaker which he tries to manipulate.  Dogen says:
When speech is uttered ordinarily, there is no immediate hearing (sokumon) at
all. . . . [T]he true looking-on lies in the very hearing-immediately.  At the time of
hearing immediately, speech is not removed from its own place to another location.
49 MAEZUMI & GLASSMAN, supra note 34, at 153.
50 Wetlaufer claims, “[W]e cannot say as a general matter that honesty is the best policy for
individual negotiators to pursue if by ‘best’ we mean most effective or most profitable.”
Wetlaufer, supra note 43, at 1230.  Within the framework suggested in this Commentary,
effectiveness and profitability are defined differently.  Contributing to more suffering and
increased ignorance to both “oneself” and “others” is neither effective nor profitable.  While
within an individualistic framework, “ethics is different from self-interest and . . . the former
will sometimes require us to sacrifice a measure of the latter.” Id. at 1234.  According to the
philosophical map described above, this sacrifice is not considered.
51 Rule 4.1 in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states, “Truthfulness in Statements
to Others,” for example, emphasizes only what shall not be done, but does not elaborate on
the affirmative aspects of “truthfulness” in professional legal life. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2009).  Also the rules of conduct that deal with “fairness” (Rule 3.4) only
elaborate on what a lawyer should not do, without asserting any affirmative guidance at all.
See id. R. 3.4.
Truthfulness from a Buddhist perspective would mean seeing reality as it is, i.e., the
realization of emptiness, impermanence, and dependent co-arising.  In addition, see infra
note 56 for Riskin’s distinction between “minimal” and “aspirational”/positive applications.
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At the time of speech, hearing immediately does not resound after being hidden in
the bosom of speech.52
The immediacy of “right speech” and the non-dualistic mindset allows one to
recover human spontaneity and fraternity, “the ‘glue’ or ‘cement’ that holds
people and societies together,” as stated by Bohm,53 replacing the tendency of
fixation and entrenchment with a flow of collaborative engagement and
involvement.
V. RIGHT CONDUCT
Cultivating the mindset suggested above, may allow conflict resolution
specialists and lawyers to evoke a dynamic at the table in which cooperation is
deeply rooted.  With that mindset, commitment to relationally-based collabora-
tion is perceived not as an ethical commitment, but as an ontological commit-
ment, a way of being-in-the-world.  Cultivating mindfulness and wisdom in the
spirit of the Buddhist worldview means, as described above, developing a deep
conviction in, and commitment to, the premises of dependent co-arising.  Given
the philosophical and ontological foundations of Buddhist philosophy, my
claim is that such commitment is not a moral commitment, but rather a deep
conviction that is part of one’s being-in-the-world, the realization that there is
no other possible way open to human beings who wish to carry out their
humanness in its fullness except through the relational inter-action and dialogic
approach.
The attachment to self-substantive entities and the development of an
adversarial mindset and style of managing conflicts is not, therefore, an
immoral or unethical act, but an act of ignorance, as understood within the
Buddhist framework. Ignorance (avidya), or lack of wisdom, which is mani-
fested also by ignoring the dependent co-arising interaction and replacing it
with an urge to manipulate the interaction—generates suffering and dis-ease.
While from a pragmatic, or—“instrumental effectiveness” perspective, it is
possible to speak of “particular distributive advantages” that may lead to ethical
misconduct,54 from a perspective of wisdom–realization within the Buddhist
framework they are understood to be disadvantages, as they are seen as
unwholesome actions that create more ignorance and suffering.
A focus on prescriptive rules to control ethical conduct is somewhat lim-
ited; however, a focus on cultivating wisdom, mindfulness, and the application
of the Buddhist principles opens new possibilities for effectively assisting a
lawyer to behave ethically and often times reaches more effective results for
her client. Under the title, “Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession,” Rule
52 KIM, supra note 44, at 87.
53 DAVID BOHM, ON DIALOGUE 6 (Lee Nichol ed., 1996).
54 Wetlaufer, supra note 43, at 1230.  He argues:
Effectiveness in negotiations is central to the business of lawyering and a willingness to lie
is central to one’s effectiveness in negotiations.  Within a wide range of circumstances, well-told
lies are highly effective.  Moreover, the temptation to lie is great not just because lies are effec-
tive, but also because the world in which most of us live is one that honors instrumental effec-
tiveness above all other things.
Id. at 1272.
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8.4 (“Misconduct”) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct specifies that it
would be an act of misconduct to “violate or attempt to violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so
through the acts of another,” or “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation . . . .”55  Following the rationale presented thus far
and Riskin’s aspiration to see a wide interpretation of the Golden Rule,56 I
suggest that there can indeed be no prescriptive rule with regard to the affirma-
tive aspect of truthfulness, or fairness, or for “right conduct.”  However, the
cultivation of wisdom and the realization of the described principles, developed
through mindfulness practices, would help the lawyer to behave ethically, as
well as to develop the practice beyond its current state and to improve the law,
a goal to which Riskin aspires.  It would allow the lawyer to act in a manner
that includes, among other things, fairness to what is no longer perceived as
“opposing party and counsel,” truthfulness towards one who is no longer seen
as an “other.”  Rather, the lawyer will handle the situation with skillful conduct,
whatever that means in the particular situation.57  That does not mean an auto-
matic adoption of a cooperative response regardless of the style of bargaining
that the other party practices at the negotiation table.  In fact, such automatic
and non-contextual adoption of a negotiation style contradicts the relational
awareness to which the Buddhist worldview aspires.  If, for example, the law-
yer representing the other party is clinging to fixed and separately constructed
views of the situation and employs a tough bargaining style, one may make
some effort to change the dynamics through skillful conduct.  If that does not
transform the dynamics, one may rightfully decide to employ a more competi-
tive style of bargaining.  However, by employing such conduct a mindful law-
yer still maintains awareness of co-arising and does not fall to the divisive us/
them apprehension of the affairs but a more complex understanding of the state
of affairs.
When deceiving or misleading the other party, or when advocating for
one’s own party while not taking the other side into account, negotiators do not
put their ethical standards in jeopardy, according to Buddhist thought, but
rather their realization of humanness and its virtues.  That lack of realization
only increases when solidifying one’s line of argumentation prior to, and
regardless of, the dynamics of the negotiation’s interaction.  Such attitude
55 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2009).
56 Riskin draws a distinction between minimal and aspirational ethical standards.  While the
former’s focus is limited to the least that we can do, that is to avoid behaving unethically, he
explains that the latter goes beyond the minimal to suggest that our ethical standards should
include how we ought to behave in relation to others.  Both sets of standards are a derivation
of the Golden Rule that we should treat others as we would have them treat us. See Riskin,
supra note 4, at 496.
57 Under Rule 1.3, titled “Diligence,” for example, “A lawyer must also act with commit-
ment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s
behalf.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2009).  This zealousness, read
not through the standard philosophical map with its zero-sum underlying premises, but
through the philosophical map suggested above, does not only imply that “[t]he lawyer’s
duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive tactics or preclude
the treating of all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect,” but
requires openness and appreciation of all persons involved as they jointly partake in the
process of co-arising. See id.
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intensifies the polarizing mindset and behavior, creates further attachment to
one’s own firm and fixed positional self, and intensifies one’s ignorance
(avidya) and suffering or dis-ease (duhkha). One is then unable to see the
complexities of the unfolding dynamics and take part in the dialogue as
described above.
Cultivating wisdom (pranya) and realizing the described tenets, enables
one to meet the challenge posed by Professor Gerald Wetlaufer, who states that
“the claim that opportunities for integrative bargaining make good behavior a
simple matter of rational, pecuniary self-interest is not nearly as strong as is
sometimes claimed . . . . [T]he case for good behavior cannot rest entirely on
pecuniary self-interest.”58  In fact, delving into the philosophical tenets of the
Buddhist worldview may add ontological rather than ethical support:  Collabo-
rating is not about behaving well, but about living up to what it means to be
human.  The ethical behavior coincides with and serves as a concrete realiza-
tion of this ontological truth.  A negotiator or anyone taking part in a conflict
resolution process who cultivates mindfulness and wisdom cultivates a mindset
aware of the fact that continuous embodiment of these understandings in one’s
deeds is an important aspect of the ongoing realization of them.  One’s negotia-
tion style and one’s management of emotions are then outcomes of one’s wis-
dom; the choices made throughout the negotiation process are in accordance
with the co-arising dynamics and flow rather than from the need to advocate for
a particular clear and distinct standpoint or follow a particular ethical precept,
as the Cartesian ethos calls for.59
In his article, Can Saints Negotiate?, Scott Peppet claims that practicing
mindfulness may lead to developing deep ethical commitment.60  He argues
that a person who develops mindfulness is “a ‘saint’ because she adopts a more
conscientious stance toward her relations with the world and others than most
of us will ever achieve.”61  A human being that acts in the spirit of wisdom as
perceived by Buddhist philosophy, I suggest, is not a saint.  He does not sacri-
fice “himself” or give up on this “self.”  He does not deny his personal needs in
favor of others’ needs.62  Rather, he continues to be inclusive and to allow
room for all needs, being mindful of their co-arising and acting in a non-divi-
sive manner.  That kind of commitment is not ethically based and does not
include the act of blindly following imperative categories and ethical demands,
as Peppet suggests.63  His being-in-the-world should not be valued through eth-
58 Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Limits of Integrative Bargaining, 85 GEO. L.J. 369, 372 (1996).
59 See generally DESCARTES, supra note 22.
60 Scott R. Peppet, Can Saints Negotiate?  A Brief Introduction to the Problems of Perfect
Ethics in Bargaining, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 83, 83-84 (2002) [hereinafter Peppet, Can
Saints Negotiate?]; accord Scott R. Peppet, Mindfulness in the Law and Alternative Dispute
Resolution, in CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW & MICHAEL WHEELER, WHAT’S FAIR:  ETHICS FOR
NEGOTIATORS 440 (2004).
61 Peppet, Can Saints Negotiate?, supra note 60, at 86.
62 That perception is based on the premise of a zero-sum game, which is part of the founda-
tion of adversarial perception.
63
“[A]t the extreme, a diligent mindfulness practitioner might eventually reach a state of
complete dedication to an ethical life.”  Peppet, Can Saints Negotiate?, supra note 60, at 86.
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ical standards,64 but rather should be seen as realization and embodiment of
ethical behavior.65  With that realization, one is not imposing upon oneself a
duty of respect to “others” or preventing oneself from lying due to its inade-
quacy with ethical rules, principles, or policy.  As opposed to commitment to
ethical demands and imperatives, I suggest, a different kind of commitment is
developing through the cultivation of mindfulness and wisdom, which resides
with the beliefs, aspirations, and wishes to utterly change the adversarial
game—a commitment to mutuality and to dialogue.
While an adversarial philosophical map may lead to unethical behavior, a
change in mindset and realization of the suggested philosophical map may lead
to doing the right action, which is also an ethical deed.  In his book Beyond
Neutrality, Bernard Mayer writes:
Probably the biggest obstacle we face in confronting the challenges to our field
lies in our own belief systems.  We can contend with the challenges of use, resis-
tance, rejection, and suspicion only if we overcome the limits we impose on our-
selves by the constraints of our own thinking.
Surrounding some of the guiding insights and principles of conflict resolution
are many operational norms, constructs, and assumptions that we need to examine,
broaden, and in some cases let go of. . . . These are beliefs that we need to examine
and challenge if we are to grow beyond the existing limits on our work.66
Cultivating mindfulness and wisdom may offer an important challenge to the
field of negotiation and conflict resolution as well as to lawyers representing
their clients, by helping to do just that—to challenge our belief system and to
offer the rethinking of some of our most sacred insights on the theoretical and
practical levels, as well as to overcome the limits that constrain our thinking.  It
is a challenge of developing a being-in-the-world whose deeds should not be
considered in terms of ethical behavior, but rather in terms of “right action/
speech” as described above, which is interdependent with having right mindful-
ness and right understanding.
In order to practice right action, one must understand the harmfulness of
actions that are “un-right.”  Acting in a manner that is un-right should be per-
64 As Peppet suggests when praising her ethical standards, “she adopts a more conscientious
stance toward her relations with the world and others than most of us will ever achieve.  Our
saint would also have to be sufficiently strong-willed to live up to her moral commitments.”
Id.
65 Pounds suggests that “[t]hrough mindfulness, the lawyer may experience a more mean-
ingful merger of the roles of adversarial advocate and integrative problem-solver.”  Pounds,
supra note 41, at 219.  However, he concludes that the interests of truthfulness in negotiation
would be best promoted by ethical principles, but stresses that these principles are nurtured
from within and that mindfulness provides a key to such internal ethical growth.  He advo-
cates for the Golden Rule and other ethical rules (e.g., “the principle of veracity” and “the
reciprocity rule”) as the ethical principles that are nurtured through mindfulness, claiming
that, “[t]o the extent that mindfulness promotes a heightened sense of interconnectedness and
a broader interpersonal perspective, it accentuates the effects of the ‘Golden Rule.’” Id. at
209.  I suggest that he is right to claim that mindfulness “is a way of seeing and being that
transcends the traditional barriers to truthfulness in negotiation,” id. at 198, though my claim
is that it is not truthfulness consistent with ethical rules, but wisdom based on the realization
of the ontological premises described above—truthfulness and ethical behavior being only
one of its manifestations.
66 BERNARD S. MAYER, BEYOND NEUTRALITY:  CONFRONTING THE CRISIS IN CONFLICT RES-
OLUTION 115 (2004).
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ceived from a perspective that does not follow the subject–object divide and the
ethical rules that follow.  An action or speech that further solidifies the separate
self, and divides the acting subject and the affected other, leads to one’s attach-
ment to one’s narrow perspective and to craving for one’s gains while cultivat-
ing a polarizing state of mind and dividing the world to wins and losses,
oneself, and others.  Such a mindset can open the door for unethical deeds.  As
mentioned, the internal logic of right action or “right speech” does not coincide
with following prescriptive ethical rules.  The next section will examine what
can serve as an affirmative, non-relativistic, or nihilistic alternative to following
such rules.
VI. ON BEING SKILLFUL
Central to the Mahayana stream in Buddhism, a later stream that was
formed in the second century and which challenged some understandings of the
Buddha’s teachings common at the time, is the concept of “skillful means”
(upaya), according to which one should be able to find the right means in every
context to manifest the wisdom of the Dharma, wisdom that is not correlated
with what is written in the texts, as these are provisional and should be left
behind like a raft discarded after crossing a river.67 One is therefore to skill-
fully articulate or do what is right in the situation in order for it to be a means to
realizing wisdom in that situation by using one’s own techniques and
methods.68
With all the differences between Buddhism and Aristotelian ontological
theory of substance, it seems that when describing the notion of wisdom in its
highest degree and the performance of a wholesome action, the Buddha’s and
Aristotle’s teachings share similar insights.  Aristotle, when discussing “the
just” and “the good” in his Nicomachean Ethics, does not provide a firm defini-
tion of these terms.  He encourages a thorough inquiry into the nature of the
good, claiming that being educated with regard to the nature of the good
involves gradual cultivation and refined understanding of it.69  One may ask,
“what is the nature of the inquiry suggested?”  Aristotle sees the good as a state
of mind and as something acquired by practice:  “[W]e learn a craft,” he
explains, “by producing the same product that we must produce when we have
learned it; we become builders, for instance, by building, and we become harp-
ists by playing the harp.  Similarly, then, we become just by doing just
67 See MICHAEL PYE, SKILFUL MEANS:  A CONCEPT IN  MAHAYANA BUDDHISM 1 (2d ed.
Routledge 2003) (1978).
68 Gunaratana, when describing the third level of morality in Buddhism, explains:
A person chooses to follow a path dictated by mindfulness, wisdom, and compassion.  This level
requires real intelligence, and an ability to juggle all the factors in every situation to arrive at a
unique, creative, and appropriate response each time.  Furthermore, the individual making these
decisions needs to have dug him- or herself out of a limited personal viewpoint.  The person has
to see the entire situation from an objective point of view, giving equal weight to his or her own
needs and those of others.
GUNARATANA, supra note 11, at 24.
69 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1094(b)24-25 (Terence Irwin trans., 2d ed. Hack-
ett Publishing Co., Inc. 1999) (located on page 2).
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actions . . . .”70  It is practical wisdom (in Greek—phronesis), gained through
practice.71  Very much like in the Buddhist worldview, there cannot be a fixed
prescription as to what form the right action should hold, but rather, it is deter-
mined contextually:  “[T]he type of accounts we demand should accord with
the subject matter; and questions about actions and expediency, like questions
about health, have no fixed answer.”72
What, then, is a good action?  What should one do in any given situation?
This knowledge, as mentioned, is attained through practice, through which one
gradually cultivates the virtuous state of mind, in the words of Aristotle, which
enables one to choose the right action in any given situation.
As noted, cultivating this mindset has many parallels in Aristotle’s and the
Buddha’s teachings.  The first teaching the Buddha taught after his awakening
in the deer park in Bodgaya (India) is the “Middle Path” (Majjhima Patipada,
the “Eightfold Path” being its elaboration).73 Avoid all extremes, teaches the
Buddha:  [F]ind the right  path between either affirming or denying, approving
or negating, between indulging in the pleasures of the senses and asceticism or
self-mortification.74  Avoiding extremes leads to peace and wisdom, mani-
fested in right speech, action, mindfulness, livelihood, etc.  Therefore, doing
the right thing involves an understanding of the Middle Path and the avoidance
of any extremes.
It seems that Aristotle has a similar notion to the Buddhist worldview
regarding cultivating ethical qualities, or “virtuous states of mind”:
First, then, we should observe that these sorts of states naturally tend to be
ruined by excess and deficiency. . . . For both excessive and deficient exercise ruin
bodily strength, and, similarly, too much or too little eating or drinking ruins health,
whereas the proportionate amount produces, increases, and preserves it.
The same is true, then, of temperance, bravery, and the other virtues.75
The principle is that, in each situation, one should act in the right measure in
that circumstance, avoiding any extremes with regard to the specific situation.
If one avoids extremes and does what is right or just for the situation, one is
acting virtuously.  Virtue of character, as defined by Aristotle, is the ability to
assess situations correctly and act appropriately.76  The choices made for action
are between excess and deficiency, and these can be determined only within
each particular context, relative to the unique circumstances.  A virtuous man
would be able to deliberate, choose correctly, and act well.  A virtuous charac-
ter is that of one who possesses a stable disposition, which allows for such
deliberations and choices.  In other words, a man with virtuous character has
the ability to do what is right contextually.77  After sufficient practice, the right
action becomes one’s spontaneous manner of action, as arises within a specific
context, and arising from the right state of mind.  Individuals should cultivate
70 Id. at 1103a33-b1 (located on page 19).
71 Id. at 1140a25-26(located on page 89).
72 Id. at 1104a3-5(located on page 19).
73 See RAHULA, supra note 16, at 45.
74 See id.
75 ARISTOTLE, supra note 69, at 1104a13-20 (located on page 20).
76 Id. at 1107a1-4 (located on page 25).
77 The word for “Virtue” in Hebrew is “Mida Tova,” which literally means “good measure.”
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this state of mind, “for actions in accord with the virtues to be done temperately
or justly it does not suffice that they themselves have the right qualities.
Rather, the agent must also be in the right state when he does them.”78
It is the development of skillful means, the skill to be in the right state and
to do the right thing that the Buddhist practice of mindfulness and wisdom
helps advance, ethical conduct being one of its manifestations.  The cultivation
of a mindset that embodies the wisdom of emptiness, impermanence, and
dependent co-arising will thus help the negotiator, lawyer, or participant in a
conflict resolution process make informed choices and to do the right thing.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Riskin draws a distinction between minimal and aspirational ethical stan-
dards, both situated in the shadow of the Golden Rule,79 that we should treat
others as we would have them treat us.  In this Commentary I have offered a
different distinction, between ethical standards at large, and what may be seen
as far more aspirational—the cultivation of wisdom and of “right conduct” in
action and speech.
The aspiration in this Commentary goes beyond the ethical rules to sug-
gest a different ontological awareness.  The realization of the different ontology
that the Buddhist worldview offers us undergirds the ethical behavior and ethi-
cal rules, as well as our management of emotions.  In fact, following the Bud-
dhist line of thought, we are left with no objective, fixed, or firm ethical rules to
which we can cling.
However, this does not lead us to hold on to the “subjective” as the alter-
native to the lack of objective, or to the dismissal of both objective rules and
subjective intentions in the name of some nihilistic perspective or an “anything
goes” stance.  Such conclusion may be either naı¨ve or dangerous, dismissive of
any form of rule of conduct or of ethical standards.  However, if one follows
the logic of emptiness dependent co-arising described above and applies it to
the relations between the objective rules of conduct and the subject use of
them—these relations should be seen in a new and different light.  I suggest
that the Buddhist framework offers us a system of thought and of being in the
world that is radically different in its foundations from the common western
thinking, and from which a different ethical vision arises.  In his Nobel Prize
Acceptance Speech in 1964, Martin Luther King Jr. said, “I believe that what
self-centered men have torn down men other-centered can build up.”80  His
vision is of a shift from self-centeredness to placing the “other” at the center of
moral judgment.  Dr. King further asserted that, “An individual has not started
living until he can rise above the narrow confines of his individualistic con-
cerns . . . .”81
78 ARISTOTLE, supra note 69, at 1105a29-32 (located on page 22).
79 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
80 Martin Luther King, Jr., Noble Peace Prize Acceptance Speech (Dec. 10, 1964), available
at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1964/king-acceptance.html.
81 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE WORDS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 3 (Jean Highland
ed. 1987).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\10-2\NVJ204.txt unknown Seq: 24  7-JUL-10 11:34
430 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:407
However, his vision is still formed within the individualistic framework,
calling for a shift from one’s own fixed and firm self to the “other’s” selfhood
as the primary concern.  The ethics that are offered by Dr. King are consistent
with the Golden Rule and are grounded in individualistic principles.  The reali-
zation of the different ontological foundation that the Buddhist thought offers
allows a shift to a different ethical system of awareness and mindfulness.  This
ethical system offers a different vision with regard to ethical conduct.
Similar to Riskin’s aspiration that one’s ethics will include the means to
go beyond the particular benefit to help improve the legal profession or the
conflict resolution profession, and to better serve people in conflict, so does the
usage of skillful means:  It is aimed at helping the people involved to improve
their realization of emptiness of self and of dependent co-arising, and may step
in where no affirmative aspect of truthfulness, or fairness, or of “right conduct”
is possible.  It may also step-in in situations where there is no clear-cut obser-
vation regarding what is appropriate ethical conduct.  In the professional lives
of lawyers, there are “grey areas” to which ethical rules and principles do not
directly relate, and it is for each lawyer’s interpretation to decide on whether a
particular act is considered ethical or unethical.  When one confronts such
dilemmas with a mindset as described in this Commentary, a lawyer may chose
to do the right thing, as defined in this article, while realizing emptiness,
impermanence, and dependent co-arising.  His deeds will also be ethical, with-
out the need to comply with certain ethical rules.  There are also “grey areas” in
which “a great number of arguments . . . are offered in support of the claim that
the lies we tell are not ethically reprehensible.”82  With the right mindset, this
kind of argumentation-rationalization is transformed.
Furthermore, with the right mindset, better management of our emotions
and a decrease in the obstacles described by Riskin is possible.83  In addition,
as Riskin stresses, better awareness of the governing concerns that underlie our
emotions can help in the process of cultivating mindfulness.  Emotional
destruction and the lack of awareness of participants’ predominant concerns
intensify ignorance and may prevent negotiators from bringing wisdom into the
room and from doing the right thing.
Doing the right thing demands a long process of cultivating right mindful-
ness and “right speech” as described in this Commentary.  There is no fast-food
description that would allow one to acquire the “right conduct” through read-
ing, but rather demands a long-term process of cultivating wisdom.  Through
82 Wetlaufer, supra note 43, at 1236.  He lists various “distinctions, excuses and justifica-
tions” that allegedly make lawyers’ lying permissible:  “I didn’t engage in the requisite act of
omission;” “I didn’t have the requisite intent;” “my statement was literally true;” “I was
speaking on a subject about which there is no truth;” “I lied, if you insist on calling it that,
but it was an omission of a kind that is presumed to be ethically permissible;” “I lied but it
was legal;” “I lied but it was on an ethically permissible subject;”  “I lied but it had little or
no effect;” “I lied but it was justified by the very nature of negotiations;” “lying is within the
rules of the game;” “I lied but it was justified by the nature of my relationship to the victim;”
“I lied but it was justified under the special ethics of lawyering (the duty of zealous advo-
cacy/ the duty to preserve confidence);” “I lied but it was ethically permissible because of
the bad conduct or the incompetence of my adversary;” “I lied but it was justified by the
good consequences it produced,” etc. See id. (providing the basis for these arguments).
83 See Riskin, supra note 3 passim.
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practicing mindfulness and the ethical behavioral aspects that reside with mind-
fulness, one gradually cultivates clarity as to what is the “right conduct” in
certain situations.
A deep problem in this area, which this Article does not fully address, is
how to reconcile Buddhist wisdom with the explicit demands of some of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct or other codes that might apply to a par-
ticular lawyer or mediator.  As Katherine Kruse describes in her contribution to
this issue,84 the lawyer’s role and duties can be defined differently.85  I believe
that without that shift from an adversarial image of the lawyer’s duty, and with-
out making the effort to become more mindful, and to consciously pursue a
context larger and more complex than the client’s immediate interests, it is
impossible to reconcile the lawyer’s “role morality,” as characterized by the
partisan pursuit of the client’s objectives,86 and the Buddhist wisdom and
descriptions of the right mindset discussed above.  There is a need for transfor-
mation in legal education to help move away from “the lawyer’s standard phil-
osophical map” and the adversarial mindset that lies in the center of it, as
described by Riskin over two decades ago.87  This is what mindfulness prac-
tice, as described by Riskin in his work in the last decade, aims at achieving.
The practice of mindfulness, and moreover, the cultivation of wisdom, would
allow an individual to develop an understanding that dialogue and inclusiveness
are not only ethical, but are also the only way open for us to practice our
humanness.  A second possible answer to this deep problem may be that the
reconciliation between real life and “Buddhist wisdom” belongs to the realm of
practical wisdom—i.e., taking place through practice and within the practice,
and that we should refrain from the ambition to analytically solve what may
appear as an unsolvable problem.
It is important to note that one does not need the metaphysical analysis
and the intellectual understanding of the ideas presented in this Article, but
rather the practical realization, the cultivation of a being-in-the-world who
rightly realizes and concretizes the dependent co-arising described above,
through speech, actions, livelihood, etc.  Otherwise, as Riskin notes with regard
to the implementation of the core concerns system, a gap opens between the
understanding and the actual implementation.88  These principles should also
not be perceived as rules that one should follow:  Their internal logic can be
realized only through their concrete manifestation.  From a pragmatic stand-
point this seems to create a problem, as it does not meet the need for an agreed-
upon set of ethical rules and behavioral standards that a lawyer should follow,
or for measurable criteria to help evaluate negotiators behavior.  As mentioned,
it calls for making the necessary effort for gradual cultivation of mindfulness
and wisdom.  However, it does not legitimize nihilistic conclusions, or belief in
subjective measures.  Through the practice of “right understanding,” “right
84 Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers in Character and Lawyers in Role, 10 NEV. L.J. 393(2010).
85 Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETH-
ICS (forthcoming 2010).
86 See id.
87 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
88 Riskin, supra note 3; see also ARISTOTLE, supra note 69, at 1103a33-b1 (located on page
19).
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mindfulness,” “right action,” “right speech,” etc., one can become more skillful
and virtuous, with regard to realizing the right thing to do, as tautological as it
may sound.
